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AlAin BAdiou: ProBlemAtics And the different 
senses of Being in Being and event1 
sean Bowden
 
 
 
 
much ink has been spilt, both in france and in the english speaking philosophical world, over Alain Badiou’s 
controversial reading of  gilles deleuze and his accusation that deleuze’s “univocal ontology” does not so 
much think the being of  the multiple as it does that of  the “one-All.”2 my intention here is not, however, to 
leap once more to deleuze’s defense. rather, i would like to examine Badiou’s ontology on its own terms and 
bring to light a little perceived aspect of  it, namely, that it presupposes what can be called a “philosophical 
problematics.”3 readers of  deleuze will of  course realize that deleuze’s ontology is often couched in terms of  
a general theory of  problems, particularly in difference and Repetition, but there will not be space here to draw out 
all of  the implications of  this fact. i shall rather concentrate on clarifying what is meant when i say that Badiou’s 
philosophical enterprise in Being and event refers to a prior problematics and examine some of  the consequences 
of  that presupposition.
◊
the ontological situation, for Badiou, is the situation that offers an account of  the “one” of  situational being 
in general. As Badiou says, the ontological situation, which is here to be understood as set theory, “presents 
presentation.”4 that is to say, it counts as “one” what is presupposed by and counted in every situation: 
inconsistent multiplicity, formalized within set-theory ontology as the void set. And this is so even if, at the limit, 
this “one” must be thought of  as a universal “for all” or an open “generic multiple” as opposed to a finished 
totality.5 for Badiou, cohen’s mathematico-ontological proof, within the Zermelo-fraenkel axiom system (Zf), 
of  the essential inconsistency of  multiple-being, reproduces within mathematical ontology the generic or “one”-
truth of  inconsistent multiple-being in general.6
that ontology is itself  a situation that presents situational being in general is, of  course, another way of  saying 
that Badiou’s ontology is an immanent ontology. Possessing such an immanent ontology, then, one would expect 
that “being” is a univocal concept in Badiou’s philosophical system. And here, all that need be understood by 
“univocal being” is that “being” means the same thing for everything that “is.” in other words, if, as is the case 
for Badiou, “there is nothing apart from situations,” and if  “ontology…is a situation” (Be 25/33), one would 
expect that ontology “is” in the same way as any other situation. however, when one examines how Badiou 
effectively develops the thesis that mathematical set theory is ontology, one sees that something more and 
altogether different is required. this “something more” is what can be called a philosophical “problematics”; 
and it is only in relation to this problematics that the thesis, “ontology = mathematics,” can be developed 
(this problematics, it must be said, runs deeper than Badiou’s meta-philosophy which, as will be seen, already 
operates according to different laws than those which govern situations in general). What seems crucial, then, 
is that the requirement of  this “supplement” means that one can only affirm that set-theory ontology “presents 
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presentation” according to another, prior presentation: a presentation of  the presentation of  presentation, as it 
were. in other words, the ontological situation cannot present itself  as the presentation of  presentation. But then 
this is finally to say that being is equivocal in Badiou’s system. Being is said in at least two different senses: once 
for the situation that is ontology itself  and once again by ontology.
In what follows, in order to flesh out my argument that there is an equivocity of  being in Badiou’s philosophy, I 
have broken matters into two sections. first of  all, i will examine Badiou’s meta-philosophy and its requirement 
of  a relation of  “compossibility” between philosophy’s conditions: an extra-ontological relation which is a 
necessary (if  not sufficient) requirement for establishing the status of  set-theory ontology. I will then move 
on to an examination of  Being and event in order to show that the affirmation “ontology = mathematics” is 
effectively determined only insofar as set theory is capable of  providing solutions to a series of  various historico-
philosophical or ontological problems, usually expressed in the form of  yet-to-be-determined relationships 
between contrary notions: the one and the multiple, nature as pre-Platonic poem versus nature as idea, the 
finite and the infinite, the continuous and the discrete, and so on. As will be seen, Badiou’s method here closely 
follows the work of  Albert lautman. At the end of  this study, it shall be seen that Badiou’s assertion that 
“ontology = mathematics” implies an equivocal concept of  being. in other words, it will be seen that being is 
said: once for this assertion in accordance with what i have called a philosophical problematics which incorporates 
both the relationship of  compossibility among philosophy’s conditions and the ideal of  a resolution of  certain 
contrary notions; and once again for what ontology can say of  being in general in accordance with this philosophical 
problematics. having established this point, by way of  conclusion, i shall turn to examine several disadvantages 
that such an equivocal conception of  being presents.
BAdiou’s metA-PhilosoPhy
for an account of  Badiou’s “meta-philosophy,” one must turn to his Manifesto for Philosophy,7 originally published 
in 1989, just one year after Being and event. i will here give a schematic outline of  the theses advanced in this 
text in order to clarify certain propositions on the nature of  the relationship that Badiou establishes between 
philosophy and the “ontological situation.”
What must be said first of  all is that philosophy, for Badiou, has a determined relationship to its outside. that is 
to say, since its way of  being is discontinuous in time and space, philosophy must have certain extra-philosophical 
“conditions” which determine it to begin, or indeed, to begin again.8 these conditions, which are of  four types, 
are the “generic” or “truth procedures” resulting from major upheavals or “events” in the fields of  science, 
politics, art and love (MP 33-36/13-16). The specific role of  philosophy, then, is to propose a unified conceptual 
space for—or, as Badiou elaborates, to think the compossibility of—its contemporary conditions (MP 37/17-18).
on the other hand, following Badiou, philosophy since descartes and up until heidegger has internally maintained 
(though obviously with modifications) certain “nodal concepts” which organize the thinking of  these external 
and diverse conditions within the same conceptual space. these nodal concepts are: “being,” “truth” (with a 
capital “T”) and “the subject” (MP 32/12). These concepts evidently have their specific correlates, depending 
on the particular philosophical conceptual family under consideration (thus, for Badiou, one finds: the situation, 
the state, the undecidable event, the indiscernible multiple, etc.). But what is crucial is that Badiou argues that 
the meaning of  all of  the concepts in his system is grounded, in the final analysis, in certain contemporary events 
in the four domains listed above (MP 79-80/59-60). In other words, philosophy’s external conditions somehow 
clarify and orient the task of  philosophy, even in the concepts which philosophy internally deploys. And this is 
so even if  the ultimate determination of  these concepts in a given philosophy must necessarily be different from 
whatever way they might be thought of  in the external conditions.
What, then, are the conditioning events for the nodal concepts of  the subject, Truth and being, and for which 
Badiou must think the compossibility? Firstly, after May 68, the Chinese Cultural Revolution and the advent 
of  Lacanian psychoanalysis, we have witnessed the collapse of  classical Marxism and the traditional figure of  
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love to the benefit of  a new “dialectics” – a new figure of  the “Two” – which need not presuppose any objective 
class or sexual essence for the political or amorous subject. With the poetry of  mallarmé and celan, among 
others, we see the destitution of  the category of  the object, that is, we arrive at the idea that truth – that is, poetic 
truth – does not entail an object. Finally, in the order of  the matheme, the development of  set theory from 
cantor to Paul cohen breaks with the traditional alternative implicated in the “gathering of  multiple-being” 
(nominalist thought or transcendent thought) and provides a rigorous concept of  the indiscernible as a “generic 
multiplicity,” allowing one to approach the truth of  the being of  any given multiple (MP 79-96/59-78).
How, then, do the nodal concepts of  philosophy – and their correlates in Badiou’s system – organize the thinking 
together of  these events (even as these events clarify the meaning of  said concepts)? Briefly, it is by affirming, 
firstly, that a truth has no need of  an object precisely because it is the result of  an infinite procedure or generic 
multiple. Secondly, it is by arguing that the Two or dialectics, rather than having an objective foundation, is 
founded upon an undecidable event which supplements a multiple-situation and leads to the production, within 
multiple-being itself, of  the truth of  this event-supplemented situation as a generic multiplicity. finally, it must 
be said that while there is no object, there is indeed a subject, which is itself  a finite moment of  this infinite 
generic procedure (MP 95-96/77-78, 108/91). It is in this schematic way that Badiou’s philosophy thinks the 
compossibility of  the truth procedures which have their origin in the aforementioned contemporary events in 
the domains of  science, politics, art and love.
one should also be careful to note here that it is altogether excluded that philosophy itself  produce truths 
(with a small “t”). Rather, for Badiou, philosophy declares that there are truths (scientific, political, etc.) which 
condition it and organizes their thinking together under the empty but operational, philosophical category of  
truth (with a capital “t”).9 indeed, if  philosophy did generate truths, be this the truth of  truths, it would 
have to deny the existence of  those truths which, as truths, impress themselves upon philosophy and condition it. 
thus, it must rather be said that instead of  producing truths, philosophy “seizes” truths. it seizes truths by means 
of  demonstrative proof  (whose schema is borrowed from the sciences), rhetorical devices (borrowed from art), 
political considerations, and the singular intensity of  love without an object, and in turn causes these truths to 
“seize us,” in the sense of  “amaze” and “captivate” (MP 123-127/C 65-69).
finally then, what can be said about this strange notion of  “compossibility”? it is widely known that this notion 
comes from Leibniz where it names a principle of  “differential consistency” between the different things – 
possible in themselves – to which God will grant existence. God, in other words, seeing all of  the different 
possibles that he conceives of  in his understanding, brings into existence, and in strict accordance with his 
perfections (god is all good, all wise, all powerful, etc.), the “richest” or “best” series of  such different possibles. 
But what is important to remember here, as leibniz says, is that not all that is possible in itself  is com-possible 
with other, different things. thus, the possibles which are in-compossible with the chosen world, while remaining 
possible in themselves, will not be brought into existence. it follows, therefore, that the sort of  consistency 
implied by the relationship of  compossibility between possibles in no way results from an evident “totalizability” 
of  possibles which would necessitate God’s choice. Indeed, God must be free to choose, as befits his concept.10 
But this in turn means two things. on the one hand, it means that god remains essentially distinct from the 
matter at stake in his choice (indeed, god is perfect and the series of  things that make up the existing world are 
necessarily imperfect). on the other hand, it means that the richest and best series of  compossibles do not form 
a necessary totality so much as infinitely converge toward a limit which is nothing other, from the finite point of  view of  existing 
individuals, than the ever vanishing difference between the perfections implied in the concept of  God and the apparent imperfections 
of  the world to which God grants existence.11 one can, therefore, say that leibnizian compossibility is a consistency 
which, while determined, remains distinct from its determinant which is in any case not a necessary totality 
but an infinite limit for the convergence of  differences in general: that is, not only for the differences between 
possibles, but also the difference between the perfections attributed to god and the imperfections of  existence. 
SEAN BOWDEN
35www.parrhesiajournal.org
Similarly, then, examining Badiou’s meta-philosophy, one can see that it is precisely this fourfold definition 
of  compossibility that is at work, even if  it is no longer god but philosophy that compossibilizes; and that it 
compossibilizes, not possible things, but truth procedures. This can be seen, first of  all, in that, in order to 
compossibilize its conditions, philosophy must provide a conceptually unified thinking of  its conditions (mP 
37-38/17-19). This “thinking together” of  the conditions, however, due to the conditions’ fundamentally 
heterogeneous natures, can in no way amount to a totalization (MP 37/18, 88/69). Thirdly, philosophy will 
remain independent of  its conditions to the extent that it is not “sutured” to any single one of  them, thereby 
handing over the freedom of  its thought to that particular procedure (see MP 61-67/41-48).12 finally, it can 
be said that the difference between the truths that condition philosophy and the empty philosophical category of  
truth (with a capital t) forms a type of  limit toward which truths, insofar as they can be thought together “in truth”, 
converge without ever reaching. this is because multiple truths could only condition philosophical truth to “seize” 
them as truths insofar as they converge upon but without ever reaching the point of  determining the truth of  truths.13 in 
other words, the systematic explanatory power of  consistent truths must be sufficient to condition Truth to 
convincingly “seize” them all and declare their existence as truths, but not enough to make this truth into “the 
truth of  truths” and thereby deny the existence of  a plurality of  truths.14 Badiou affirms this fourfold definition 
of  “compossibility” when he describes philosophy as a “system” which carries out “a complete configuration of  
the four generic conditions of  philosophy…by means of  an exposition that also exposes its expository rule,” but 
without recourse to any “supreme signifier” (MP 66/46). And indeed, it has been outlined above how Badiou’s 
system, beginning with the idea that any philosophy necessarily has certain conditions, both defines and is 
defined by the compossibility of  its contemporary conditions.
Some conclusions can now be drawn from this discussion. What must first of  all be said is that if  philosophy is 
not a truth procedure, nor is it a “situation.” on the one hand, it seems to be irreducibly inter-situational: it does 
not strictly speaking “present” or even “re-present” its conditions; it is rather between them, un-sutured as it were. 
On the other hand, having no “master signifier” and not being a truth procedure (philosophy cannot have the 
sort of  being that corresponds to a truth), philosophy has no articulable structure which would “count-as-one” its 
matter. Philosophy, it seems, is entirely unique and operates according to a law—that of  the compossibilization 
of  its conditions—which is totally unlike the laws that govern situations in general. indeed, and this will here 
form the crux of  my reading of  Badiou, would it not be possible to describe this law of  compossibilization 
within the framework of  a “problematics,” a problematics that would precede any ontological “axiomatics”?15 in 
other words, to the extent that philosophy is therein determined to resolve the forever open problem implied 
in the articulation of  truths to determine truth to seize them as such, does not compossibilization appear to 
be irreducibly problematic? i shall examine in greater detail this notion of  the “problematic” in the following 
section.
The second conclusion that can be drawn relates more specifically to how Badiou must think the relationship 
between philosophy and the “ontological situation,” which here corresponds to the event of  set theory. it is 
known that the philosophical designation of  the event of  set theory as ontology must result from the way in 
which philosophy’s external, evental conditions—bearing on the internal nodal concepts of  “being,” “truth” 
and “the subject”—can be thought together as compossible. In a necessary (but, as will be seen, not sufficient) 
sense then, it is only because of  the prior demands of  philosophy’s conditions that Being and event will set out to 
show how the development of  set theory from cantor to cohen can provide the general framework for thinking 
being qua being. But now, it should also be clear that, insofar as this “prior demand” is articulated in the work 
of  compossibilization, it is nothing other than the demand of  a prior problematics: the problem of  articulating 
philosophy’s conditions to determine truth to seize them as truths. i shall return to this point. for now, let us 
turn to an examination of  the first half  of  Being and event—the “Being” section as it were—in order to clarify how 
Badiou effectively establishes therein the thesis “ontology = mathematics.” As will be seen, Badiou’s method 
here goes beyond the scope of  his meta-philosophy.
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ProBlemAtics in Being and event
I would like to show in this section that the affirmation that set theory is ontology emerges as a response to a 
series of  more or less traditional metaphysical problems (and this quite apart from Badiou’s meditations, which 
will not be dealt with here, on various figures in the history of  philosophy). These problems are expressed in 
the form of  pairs of  contrary notions or dialectical couples: the one and the multiple, nature as pre-Platonic 
poem versus Nature as Idea, the finite and the infinite (the distribution of  being-in-totality) and the continuous 
and the discontinuous. i shall demonstrate below exactly how the Zf axioms which “found” Badiou’s set-theory 
ontology (BE 499/536) together resolve this series of  dialectical couples. But first of  all, let us briefly examine 
the work of  Albert lautman, since Badiou’s method here seems to be in accordance with lautman’s theses, and 
since Badiou openly declares that what he owes to lautman’s writings, “even in the very foundational intuitions 
for this book [i.e., Being and event], is immeasurable” (BE 482/522).
Lautman and the dialectic of  ideas. 
the philosopher of  mathematics, Albert lautman, distinguished several layers of  mathematical reality. Apart 
from mathematical facts, entities and theories, lautman also argued for the existence of  a “dialectic of  ideas” 
which governs the development of  theories and provides them with their unity, meaning and philosophical 
value.16 this dialectic, following lautman, is constituted by pairs of  opposites (same and other, whole and part, 
continuous and discontinuous, essence and existence, etc.), and the ideas of  this dialectic present themselves 
as the problem of  establishing relationships between these opposed notions (MIRP 229, 243, 260, 276). As 
prior “questions” or “logical concerns” relative to possible affirmations of  existence within mathematical 
discourse, these problematic ideas are thus transcendent with respect to mathematics and can be posed outside 
of  mathematics. indeed, many of  the pairs of  opposites analyzed by lautman can be found in the history 
of  philosophy. however, since the ideas, in order to be thought concretely, require an appropriate “matter” 
in which they can be thought, any effort to respond to the problems that they pose is to effectively constitute 
mathematical theory. in this sense, therefore, the dialectic must equally be said to be immanent to mathematics 
(mirP 66, 229, 243-244, 262).
in order to avoid the charge of  a naive idealism (indeed, lautman’s “Platonism” bears little resemblance to 
that which is ordinarily labeled Platonism in mathematics), lautman is careful to qualify the transcendence of  
ideas as simply the possibility of  experiencing concern for a mode of  connection between two ideas (mirP 229). 
the anteriority of  ideas is here rational, logical or ontological as opposed to psychological or historical (mirP 
260). And this is precisely why Lautman argues that mathematics not only incarnates traditional metaphysical 
problems; it can also give birth to problems which could not have been previously posed. the philosophy 
of  mathematics does not, therefore, consist so much in finding a classical metaphysical problem within a 
mathematical theory, as grasping the overall structure of  a theory in order to extract the logical problem which 
is at once defined and resolved by the very existence of  this theory (MIRP 229). Nevertheless, as Lautman goes 
on to argue, just as, in the very meaning of  these terms, “intention” must precede “design” and the question the 
response, the existence of  established mathematical relations necessarily refers to the prior, positive idea of  the 
search for such relations (MIRP 242). Or to put it another way, because the sufficient reason for the diversity and 
development of  mathematical theories, along with their progressive integrations and interferences, cannot be 
found within mathematics itself,17 one is obliged to affirm the prior existence of  something like the dialectic of  
ideas. in short, to conceive of  the historical development of  diverse mathematical theories and their “mixes”18 
as responses or solutions to problematic ideas is to give unity and meaning to these theories.
it is of  course clear that Badiou’s concern is not that of  the unity and meaning of  mathematics in lautman’s 
sense. however, it is the contention of  this essay that there is something like a dialectic of  ideas that traverses 
Being and event, and that it is precisely this dialectic that allows Badiou to make the claim that “ontology = 
set theory.” or to put it another way, it is only because Badiou shows set theory to be capable of  providing a 
systematic response to a series of  dialectically opposed notions which can be found in the history of  ontology 
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(and philosophy more generally) that set theory can be said to be ontology. indeed, it has already been seen at 
a meta-philosophical level how the development of  set theory, insofar as it is taken up by Badiou as one of  his 
philosophy’s conditions, must be understood as providing, in its compossibility with other such conditions, a 
partial resolution to the problematic relation between “the particular and the universal” such as this applies to 
what falls under Badiou’s philosophical conception of  truth. But it is to uncover the functioning of  some other 
problematic pairs of  opposites at work in Being and event that we must now turn.
the One and the Multiple. 
Being and event begins by outlining and then advancing a solution to the problem of  the “one and the multiple.” 
this is a problem, Badiou argues, that any possible ontology will have to deal with. it can be unpacked as 
follows. firstly, any presented concrete thing must be one. it is, after all, this thing. secondly, however, it is obvious 
that presentation itself  is multiple: it is only ever a more or less confused manifold that is synthesized or counted 
as one. When it is asked whether being is one or multiple, therefore, one comes to an impasse. for, on the one 
hand, if  being is one, then the multiple cannot be. on the other hand, if  presentation is multiple and there 
cannot be an access to being outside of  all presentation, then the multiple must be. But if  the multiple is, then 
being is not equivalent to the one. And yet there is a presentation of  this multiple only if  what is presented is 
one. Badiou then says that this deadlock can only be broken by a decision which he does not hesitate to make: 
that the one, strictly speaking, is not, it can only be a result, a presented multiplicity which has been counted for one. 
Badiou calls such a consistent multiplicity a situation, and every situation must have a structure which prescribes 
the regime of  its count-for-one (Be 23-24/31-32).
The picture that ensues from this decision is the following: every identifiable being is in situation. Every being is, 
in other words, a consistent multiplicity, counted-for-one. indeed, what is not in situation, what is not counted-
for-one as this or that thing, could only be qualified as no-thing. “there are” only situations, that is, consistent one-
multiples, and these situations must all be downstream from a structuring or count-as-one operation (whatever 
this may turn out to be). indeed, even ontology must be a structured situation. however, at the same time, to 
say as i did above that the one is a result must mean that upstream from any possible count-as-one there must be, 
and could only be, inconsistent multiplicity. In the final analysis, then, if  the one is always already only a result, 
inconsistent multiplicity—this no-thing which is outside of  any situation—must necessarily be presupposed as the 
very “stuff ” that is counted and hence the pure unqualified being of  any possible being (BE 24-25/32-34).
But now, since being is presented in every presentation, and since everything that “is” must be in situation, this 
unqualified being could itself  “be” only in presentation. So, then, what could be the structure – the science – of  
this inconsistent or unqualified being qua being? in other words, what could ontology be? it must be a situation 
capable of  presenting inconsistent multiplicity as that from which every in-situation “thing” is composed. it will 
“present presentation” in general (BE 27-28/35-36). The only way that ontology can do this, following Badiou, 
is by showing in its very structure that this no-thing exists, and that everything in the ontological situation is 
composed out of  it, but without thereby giving it any other predicate other than its multiplicity. And for Badiou, 
it is the axioms of  set-theory which fulfill this prior structural necessity, since they only give an implicit definition of  what 
it operates on: the pure multiple (BE 28-30/36-38, 52-59/65-72). In short, then, for Badiou, insofar as set theory 
alone can respond to the above analyzed ontological problematic, it is the only possible ontology.
So how exactly do the ZF axioms fulfill ontology’s a priori requirements, the requirements which, it is evident, 
correspond to nothing internal to set theory? first of  all, it reduces the one to the status of  a relationship, that of  
simple belonging, written ∈. in other words, everything will be presented, not according to the one of  a concept, 
but only according to its relation of  belonging or counting-for-one: ‘something = α’ will thus only be presented 
according to a multiple β, written α ∈ β or ‘α is an element of  β.’ secondly, the theory has only one type of  
variable and hence does not distinguish between “objects” and “groups of  objects,” or between “elements” and 
“sets.” in other words, to be an element is not an intrinsic quality in Zf. it is a simple relation: to-be-an-element-
of. Thus, by the uniformity of  its variables, the theory can indicate without definition that it does not speak of  
38
ProBlemAtics And the different senses of Being in Being and event
www.parrhesiajournal.org
the one, and that all that it presents in the implicitness of  its rules are multiples of  multiples: multiples belonging 
to or presented by other multiples. Indeed, and thirdly, via the “axiom of  separation,” the system affirms that 
a property or formula of  language does not directly present an existing multiple. rather, such a presentation 
could only ever be a “separation” or sub-set of  an already presented multiplicity. A property only determines 
a multiple under the supposition that there is already a presented multiple (BE 43-48/54-59). Everything thus 
hinges on the determination of  the initial pure multiple. But as was seen above, as a necessary consequence of  
the decision that the one results—called for by the paradoxical relationship between the one and the multiple—
there must be, upstream from any count, inconsistent multiplicity, and it is this which is counted. it appears, 
then, that this inconsistent multiple—the void, the unpresentable of  presentative consistency—is the absolutely 
initial multiple.
But now, how can the void have its existence assured, and in such a way that ontology can weave all of  its 
compositions from it alone? As Badiou says, it is by making this nothing be through the assumption of  a pure 
proper name: Ø (BE 66-67/80). That the void is presented – named – is not to say, of  course, that the void is 
thereby one. What is named is not the one of  the void, but rather its uniqueness, its “unicity.” in what sense is the 
void unique? Another axiom of  ZF tells us this. This is the “axiom of  extensionality” which will fix the rule of  
the difference or sameness for any two multiples whatsoever; that is, according to the elements which belong 
to each. the void set, then, having no elements—being the multiple of  nothing—can have no conceivable 
differentiating mark according to this axiom. But then, if  no difference can be attested, this means that there is 
a unicity of  the unpresentable within presentation. there cannot be “several” voids: the void is unique and this 
is what is signaled by the proper name, Ø (BE 67-69/80-83).
so how does set-theory ontology weave its compositions out of  this proper name? What is crucial to this 
operation is the “power-set axiom” or “axiom of  subsets.” this axiom guarantees that if  a set exists, another 
set also exists that counts as one all the subsets of  this first set, thereby regulating or counting as one the internal 
compositions of  a given being or situation. it has been seen what belonging means: an element (a multiple) belongs 
to a situation (a set) if  it is directly presented and counted for one by this situation. inclusion, on the other 
hand, concerns subsets or parts of  a situation rather than directly presented elements. in other words, elements 
directly presented by a set can be re-presented, that is, grouped into subsets that are said to be included in the 
initial set. inclusion is written ⊂: α ⊂ β or α is a subset (a part) of  β.19 the power-set axiom gathers together or 
counts as one all such inclusions, all of  the sub-compositions of  internal multiples. it says that if  a set α exists, 
there also exists the set of  all its subsets: its power set p(α) (BE 81-84/95-98). What, then, can be said of  the void 
from the point of  view of  the difference between belonging and inclusion?
it has already been seen that the void is never presented: it never belongs to another multiple. What is more, 
since the void is the multiple of  nothing, nothing belongs to the void. however, it can be shown both that the 
void is a subset of  any set – it is universally included – and that the void possesses a subset, which is the void itself  
(BE 86/100). Indeed, it is impossible for the empty set not to be universally included. for, following the axiom 
of  extensionality, since the set Ø has no elements, nothing is marked which could deny its inclusion in any 
multiple.20 furthermore, then, since the set Ø is itself  an existent-multiple, Ø must be a subset of  itself  (Be 
86-87/101-102).
one can now begin to see how the laws of  being will weave its compositions out of  the void. the argument is as 
follows: since the void admits at least one subset, itself, the power-set axiom can be applied. the set of  subsets 
of  the void, p(Ø), is the set to which everything included in the void belongs. thus, since Ø is included in Ø, Ø 
belongs to p(Ø). this new set, p(Ø), is thus “our second existent-multiple in the ‘genealogical’ framework of  the 
set-theory axiomatic. it is written {Ø} and Ø is its sole element”: Ø ∈ {Ø} (BE 89/103). Now, let us consider 
the set of  subsets of  {Ø}, that is p({Ø}). this set exists, since {Ø} exists. What, then, are the parts of  {Ø}? 
there is {Ø} itself, which is the total part, and there is Ø, since the void is universally included in any multiple. 
the multiple p({Ø}) is thus a multiple with two elements, Ø and {Ø}. this is, in fact, woven from the void, 
“the ontological schema of  the Two,” which can be written {Ø,{Ø}} (BE 92/106-107, 131-132/150-151). 
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it becomes clear that this is where the unlimited production of  new multiples begins, woven from the void in 
accordance with the laws of  being (and particularly the power-set axiom). for, since this set, {Ø,{Ø}}, exists, 
one can consider its power set p({Ø,{Ø}}), etc. … This process can obviously be repeated indefinitely and it is 
in fact in this way that one can generate our counting numbers, our “natural” or “ordinal” numbers (also called 
Von neumann ordinals):
 0 = Ø
 1 = {Ø} = {0}
 2 = {Ø,{Ø}} = {0,1}
 3 = {Ø,{Ø},{Ø,{Ø}}} = {0,1,2}…21
nature as Pre-Platonic Poem or nature as idea. 
indeed, it is from this generation of  “natural” numbers, all woven from the void in accordance with the axioms 
of  being, that Badiou will establish his concept of  “nature.” or more precisely, that Badiou understands nature 
in this way is the result of  the way in which set-theory ontology provides a resolution of  the tension, highlighted 
since the work of  heidegger, between nature understood poetically as appearance or the poetic coming-to-
presence of  being (the pre-Platonic poem), and nature interpreted as idea, subtracted from all appearance (in 
the manner of  Plato) (BE 123-129/141-147; on Plato see also BE 31-37/41-47). In other words, within the 
perspective of  a set-theoretical ontology, Badiou will be able to find another arrangement of  these two opposed 
orientations. in short, following heidegger, he will maintain that nature is “the stability of  maintaining-itself-
there” within the opening forth of  its immanent coming-to-presence. on the other hand, he will mathematize 
the Platonic subtraction of  being from appearance. or again, he will develop a concept of  nature as a network 
of  multiples which are interlocking and exhaustive without remainder, but which are also woven entirely from 
what is subtracted from all presence: the void. the point is, of  course, that without reference to the opposing 
conceptions of  nature belonging to heidegger and Plato, the assertion that natural or ordinal numbers formalize 
the being of  natural things would appear somewhat arbitrary or as a play on words. certainly, nothing within 
set theory itself  authorizes such an ontological appropriation of  the generation of  ordinals.
let us follow Badiou as he formulates his concept of  nature in the wake of  this dialectical couple. on the 
one hand, conceding the stability of  nature to heidegger, a multiple α will be said to be natural (also called 
normal, ordinal or transitive) if  every element β of  this set is also a subset or part (that is, if  β ∈ α then β 
⊂ α), and if  every element β of  α is itself  natural in this way (that is, if  γ ∈ β then γ ⊂ β). this doubling of  
belonging and inclusion guarantees that there is nothing uncounted or unsecured in natural multiples which 
might contradict their internal consistency and concatenation. Just as nature can never contradict itself, natural 
multiples remain homogeneous in dissemination. every natural multiple is here obviously a “piece” of  another, 
for, by the definition of  inclusion, if  β is included in the natural multiple α, every element γ that belongs to β 
must also belong to α, and so on (BE 123-129/141-147).
on the other hand, mathematizing Platonic subtraction, it can be said that the name of  the void founds the 
series of  natural multiples, conceived of  in the way that has just been seen, in the double sense of  formalizing its 
concept and acting as its indivisible limit or atom. As examined above, an unlimited series of  natural multiples 
can be generated from the void and the laws of  ontology. for not only does the element {Ø} have Ø as its 
unique element, since the void is a universal part, this element Ø is also a part. furthermore, since the element 
Ø does not present any element, nothing belongs to it that is not a part. there is thus no obstacle to declaring it 
to be natural. As such, the power set of  {Ø}—p({Ø}) or the two: {Ø,{Ø}}—is natural, and all of  its elements 
are natural, etc. ordinal numbers thus both formalize the concept of  natural multiples within set theory and are 
themselves existing natural multiples. And what is more, the name of  the void is the ultimate natural element 
or atom which founds the entire series, in the sense in which the void is the “smallest” natural multiple. in other 
words, if  every natural multiple is a “piece” of  every other, the void is the only natural multiple to which no 
further element belongs (BE 130-140/149-159).
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needless to say, however, in Badiou’s set-theoretical concept of  nature, there can be no possible formulation of  
nature in itself. for nature in itself  would have to be a multiple which makes a one out of  all the ordinals. But 
since this multiple would itself  have to be an ordinal to make a one out of  all the ordinals that belong to it, it 
would have to belong to itself. however, since no set can belong to itself, nature in itself  can have no sayable 
being (BE 140-141/159-160). Indeed, that no founded or consistent set can belong to itself  is a fundamental 
presupposition of  set theory. the Zf axiom system can even be said to have arisen in response to the paradoxes 
induced by self-belonging, such as those demonstrated by Russell (BE 40-43/51-54). In fact, the ZF “axiom of  
foundation” was formulated in order to exclude the introduction of  sets which belong to themselves. this axiom 
says that a set is founded if  it has at least one element whose elements are not themselves elements of  the initial 
set, that is, if  it contains an element which has no members in common with the initial set. it is thus obvious 
that no set founded in this way can belong to itself  (BE 185-187/207-208).
The Finite and the Infinite: the Distribution of  Being-in-Totality. 
this last point leads to a further problem, even if  Badiou does not pose it in quite this way. What is crucial 
here is that this problem corresponds to that of  the ontological problem of  being-in-totality. it has been seen 
that there cannot be a set of  all sets which would govern the total count. But this does not in any way dispense 
with the task of  examining the operation of  the count. for precisely, when one turns to examine it, one notices 
something strange: because the one is not, because the count-as-one is only an operation, something always 
escapes the count-as-one and threatens thereby to ruin consistency. this “something” is nothing other than the 
count itself, and this is true of  natural as much as non-natural situations (BE 93-94/109-110). In other words, 
because the “one” is only an operational result, if  the count-as-one is not itself  counted for one, it is impossible 
to verify that ‘there is oneness’ is also valid for the counting operation. “the consistency of  presentation thus 
requires that all structure be doubled by a metastructure which secures the former against any fixation of  the 
void,” that is, against any inconsistency (BE 93-94/109). This metastructure of  a structured set—what Badiou 
also calls the state of  the situation (Be 95/111) —is precisely the power set which counts as one all of  the initial set’s 
parts. that is to say that it counts all of  the possible internal compositions of  the elements of  the initial set up to and 
including the “total part”: the composition of  elements that is the initial set. “the completeness of  the initial 
one-effect is thus definitely, in turn, counted as one by the sate in the form of  its effective whole” (BE 98/114).
Be that as it may, one cannot dispense in this way with the problem of  the completion of  the count of  one-
results without also dealing with a second historico-philosophical problem, a problem which can be phrased 
as: what is the relationship between being-in-totality and the finite/infinite couple? Or again: in the shadow 
of  the problem of  being-in-totality, what does it mean to say with the moderns that nature is essentially infinite 
(Be 143/162)? following Badiou’s reconstruction of  the history of  the relationship between being-in-totality 
and the finite/infinite couple, one observes first of  all that Aristotle’s ontology was a finite ontology, since he 
refused to accept the existence of  anything actually infinite or “nontraversable” in physical nature. indeed, for 
Aristotle, infinity could only be “potential.” Medieval ontology, for its part, kept the finite Aristotelian ontology 
and supplemented it with an infinite being: God. Being-in-totality was thus here distributed into finite and 
infinite beings, God representing the punctual limit of  what finite beings cannot know (BE 142-143/161-162). 
Now, however, with the moderns, the concept of  infinity shifts from God to Nature. But this does not mean 
that nature is likened to a de-punctualized god. indeed, as shown in Kant’s antinomies, the one of  nature 
is illusory. thus, following Badiou, since the one is not, that Nature is infinite must necessarily mean that presentation 
itself  is infinite, and indeed infinitely infinite. If  the one is not, there cannot be any one-infinite-being but only, as 
will be seen, numerous infinite multiples. The recognition of  the infinity of  Nature, the infinity of  being, is the 
recognition of  the infinity of  situations: the count-as-one, even of  a finite natural multiple, concerns an infinity 
of  infinite multiples (BE 143-146/162-165).
What does it mean exactly when Badiou says that Nature or the count-as-one concerns infinite multiples? To 
say that situations are essentially infinite must mean that the finite is itself  derived from the infinite. For, precisely, 
would not the succession of  finite natural multiples or ordinals have need of  the infinite in order to qualify it as the 
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one-multiple that it is, that is, in order to form-one out of  all of  its terms? This is what the “axiom of  infinity” 
declares: there exists an infinite limit ordinal, ω
0
, and for all α, if α belongs to this limit ordinal and if α is not void, 
then α is a finite, natural successor ordinal (Ø of  course is the initial existent multiple, not a successor). One can 
thus see that infinity counts-as-one all of  the successor ordinals insofar as it is the “support-multiple in which all 
the ordinals passed through mark themselves, step by step” (BE 155-156/175).
Strictly speaking, however, infinity is not simply equivalent to the limit ordinal ω
0
, for one can also generate 
infinite successor ordinals for it such that, precisely, ω0 ∈ S(ω0) (also written ω1) (see BE 275-277/304-306).22 
So, then, an ordinal is infinite if  it is ω
0
 or if  ω
0
 belongs to it. An ordinal is finite if  it belongs to ω
0
 (BE 158-
159/177-178).
It is thus in this way that Badiou can affirm, with the moderns but also within his set-theory ontology, that nature 
is infinite. Or again, that being qua being is infinite. Or finally, that what can be said of  being qua being – the 
presentation of  inconsistent multiplicity or of  what would be presentation in itself  – essentially concerns infinite 
multiples and indeed, since one can always generate further infinite successor ordinals, an infinite number of  
infinite multiples (see BE 275-277/304-306). Yet this is not the end of  the problem of  the distribution of  the 
finite and the infinite within being-in-totality. For it must now be asked: what here becomes of  the necessary 
re-securing relationship between presentation and re-presentation—between the count and the count of  the 
count—with respect to this understanding of  the essential infinity of  natural presentation? For a finite set of  
n elements, the power set is obviously equivalent to 2n, but what could the power-set of  an infinite set possibly 
amount to?
the Continuous and the discrete. 
in fact, the more precise question that Badiou asks is the following: is the power-set p(ω
0
)—that is to say, the 
count-as-one of  all possible sub-sets of  the complete series of  finite natural numbers, sufficient for a complete 
numerical description of  the geometrical continuum—equivalent to ω1, the smallest infinite natural multiple 
which directly succeeds and counts-as-one ω
0
? This is Cantor’s famous “continuum hypothesis” (see BE 295/327). 
the importance of  this hypothesis is that, if  it were true, we would have a “natural measure” for the geometrical 
or physical continuum. or in other words, we would have a quantitative knowledge of  being qua being. for, if  
the continuum could be numerically measured, every discrete multiple could be quantitatively secured therein. 
the “great question” of  Badiou’s set-theory ontology, translating the problematic couple continuous/discrete, 
is thus: is there an essential “numerosity” of  being (Be 265/293)? the answer is: we possess a natural measuring 
scale (the succession of  ordinals), but it is impossible to determine where, on this scale, the set of  parts of  ω
0
 is 
situated (BE 277-278/306-307). Or more precisely, following the work of  Cohen and Easton, it appears that 
it is deductively acceptable to posit that [p(ω
0
) is equal to] ω
347
, or ω(ω
0
)
+18
, or whatever other cardinal 
as immense as you like…easton’s theorem establishes the quasi-total errancy of  the excess of  the 
state over the situation. it is as though, between the structure in which the immediacy of  belonging is 
delivered, and the metastructure which counts as one the parts and regulates the inclusions, a chasm 
opens (BE 280/308-309).
to recap: on the one hand, the one is not and being qua being essentially concerns an infinite number of  
rigorously defined, infinite, natural multiples, all woven from the void (BE 269/298: “being is universally deployed as 
nature”). on the other hand, the ‘there is oneness’ of  the presentation of  such multiples—the count of  the count 
—must be completely secured in order to render these discrete “one”-beings consistent (BE 93-94/109-110). 
But now this means that, if  one had a measure for this void-less continuum one would also have a quantitative 
knowledge of  being qua being. This measurement cannot, however, be fixed. This “un-measure,” that is to 
say, this variant on the enduring metaphysical problem of  the relationship between the discontinuous and the 
continuous – itself  the more general expression of  the question of  the distribution of  the finite and the infinite 
within being-in-totality – is what Badiou calls the “impasse of  ontology” (BE 279/307).23 to resolve it, Badiou 
will be led to a consideration of  what, within cohen’s “ontological” technique of  forcing, corresponds to the 
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meta-ontological notions of  the event, the subject and truth.
I cannot examine in detail these further developments. Suffice it to say that the event will be an unfounded 
multiple (inscribed in ontology by the supplementary signifier F) which supplements the situation for which it 
is an event. It will be a self-founding “supernumerary” something – named or posited as existent – whose place 
cannot be recognized in the situation as given, even though it can come to belong to or be counted within that 
situation, giving thereby the general “one-truth” of  said situation. this supplementation by the event will call 
for a subject who asserts and then verifies—by examining one by one the connection of  the infinite number of  
in-situation multiples to the event—the existence of  the supernumerary event in the situation. This subject “is” 
here nothing other than a finite multiple or “fragment” of  an infinite procedure of  verification, a finite fragment 
which maintains a law-like relation to the aforementioned “one-truth” which can be articulated in ontology 
(forcing). finally, the truth of  the situation will be the “indiscernible” or “generic” multiplicity which will have 
resulted from the necessarily infinite procedure of  verification which groups as “one” all of  the terms of  the 
situation that are positively connected to the name of  the self-founding event.
or again, to put it more “ontologically,” cohen’s technique shows that sets of  conditions of  a generic subset 
F can be constructed which force, in a generic extension, the number of  parts of  ω
0
 to surpass an absolutely 
indeterminate cardinal δ given in advance (see BE 420-426/459-466). This is the effective “ontological proof ” 
of  the “un-measure” of  the continuum. But at the same time, as Badiou argues, this proof  produces within 
ontology a “one” account of  inconsistent being qua being. How? In short, it constructs an infinite generic 
multiple by collecting, starting from the void, series of  multiples attached to a supplementary, evental signifier F. 
But because it is not itself  “discerned,” this generic multiple sets no limits to what it can rigorously collect as 
one and is thus, in the final analysis,
composed of  terms which have nothing in common that could be remarked, save belonging 
to this situation; which, strictly speaking, is its being, qua being…it is rightfully declared generic, 
because, if  one wishes to qualify it, all one can say is that its elements are…[this is] the truth of  
the entire situation, insofar as the sense of  the indiscernible is that of  exhibiting as one-multiple the 
very being of  what belongs insofar as it belongs (BE 338-339/373-374).
Be this as it may, what is important here—quite apart from noting that the “resolution” of  the dialectical couple 
continuous/discrete contributes to the determination of  these formulations as ontological—is that ontology 
can only come to present this generic “one-multiple” via a subjective intervention or practical truth-procedure 
(BE 18/25: “the saying of  being occurs…as a truth”). the “ontologist,” as it were, must choose to intervene in 
the ontological situation in order to construct the generic multiple. in other words, to return to my remarks on 
Badiou’s meta-philosophy, the determination of  these ontological formulations requires a prior comprehension 
of  what is at work in any truth-procedure: the event, the subject and truth. But then this is also to say that, 
following the arguments above, it is only in relation to the problem of  articulating various “particular” truths (or 
truth-procedures) to determine a kind of  “quasi-universal” truth to seize them as such, that the development 
of  set theory from cantor to cohen can be shown to provide the general framework for the thought of  being 
qua being.
◊
ultimately then, it appears that the ontology outlined in Being and event is determined only in relation to the ideal 
of  a resolution of  a series of  dialectical couples in the lautmanian sense: the one and the multiple, nature as 
pre-Platonic poem versus Nature as Idea, the finite and the infinite, the discrete and the continuous and, finally, 
at a meta-philosophical level, the particular and the universal such as this applies to truths. Badiou’s ontology 
“presents presentation,” therefore, only in relation to another, prior presentation: as a response to a series 
of  problems. indeed, since nothing internal to set theory marks its ontological vocation, such a problematic 
supplement seems absolutely necessary. But then this is also to say that being is equivocal in Badiou’s system. 
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Being is said once for ontology in accordance with what i have called a philosophical problematics; and it is said once 
again for what ontology can say of being in general in accordance with this philosophical problematics.
of  course, Badiou would reply to this that if  having an equivocal conception of  being is what is required in 
order to think the particular, compossible truths that he wants to defend, then he is happy to bear the criticism. 
As he writes in Deleuze: The Clamor of  Being, although in relation to a reading of  his system that differs from the 
one presented here, except in relation to the charge of  equivocity:
deleuze always maintained that… i fall back into transcendence and into the equivocity of  
analogy. But, all in all, if  the only way to think a political revolution, an amorous encounter, 
an invention of  the sciences, or a creative work of  art as distinct infinities – having as their 
condition incommensurable events – is by sacrificing immanence (which I do not actually 
believe is the case, but that is not what matters here) and the univocity of  Being, then i would 
sacrifice them.24
But what disadvantages does such a conception in fact present? The first disadvantage, of  course, is that Badiou 
does not have a single or unified concept of  being. It is true that, in the history of  ontology, being has often 
been said in different senses: in Aristotle, for example, but also in the work of  various medieval philosophers, 
for whom god “is” in a different way from the way in which his creatures “are” (duns scotus here being the 
notable exception). nevertheless, ockham’s razor could apply here, leading one to prefer an ontology in which 
being is said in a single sense of  all there is.
A second disadvantage would be that, because Badiou’s ontology presupposes a prior philosophical problematics, 
but does not itself  think the nature of  this problematics, it cannot think its relation to another philosophical system which 
presents itself  as a different but equally systematic solution to the same problems which Badiou’s ontology 
resolves, except as irreducible subjective conflict pure and simple. Again, this would not concern Badiou, who has a 
militant conception of  the subject. But perhaps it would be of  concern for those seeking a more supple approach 
to thinking the relations between the antagonistic subjectivities—political, scientific, and so on—which can fall 
under different philosophical world views.
thirdly, and following on from the second point, it appears that Badiou cannot welcome those novel truths— 
in the fields of  science, art, politics and love—which would be incompossible with those which make up his own 
philosophical system. of  course, that such “incompossible truths” could exist as such remains to be demonstrated. 
however, one can surmise that, should they exist, their relation with other evental truths would more easily be 
thought in terms of  a general, philosophical theory of  problems. in terms of  this theory, whether compossible 
or incompossible, such truths, along with the subjective truth procedures they give rise to, could only be said to 
“solve” and “dissolve” an underlying “problematic base” in an ongoing and related way, as opposed to being 
pitted against one another.
in short, then, taking these three points together, one can ask oneself  the following critical question: can a 
univocal conception of  being be conceived of  if  it is based on problematics alone, that is, if  beings in general 
emerge as solutions to this problematics, and in such a way that the various antagonistic subjectivities and evental 
novelties which characterize our contemporary world can be thought together without irreducible conflict? I 
believe that gilles deleuze, another follower of  lautman, has developed such an ontology, particularly in his 
difference and Repetition. As deleuze writes:
the problem is at once transcendent and immanent in relation to its solutions. transcendent 
because it consists in a system of  ideal liaisons or differential relations between genetic elements. 
immanent, because these liaisons or relations are incarnated in the actual relations which 
do not resemble them and are defined by the field of  solution. Nowhere better than in the 
admirable work of  Albert Lautman has it been shown how problems are first Platonic Ideas 
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or ideal liaisons between dialectical notions, relative to ‘eventual situations of  the existent’; but 
also how they are realized within the real relations constitutive of  the desired solution with a 
mathematical, physical or other field.25
Such a conception, it would seem, might offer a way around some of  the difficulties associated with 
Badiou’s fascinating project. Nevertheless, the justification of  this claim cannot be dealt with here. 
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description of  the geometrical continuum—cannot be equivalent to ω1, the smallest infinite natural multiple which directly 
succeeds and counts-as-one ω
0
. What this means is that the count-as-one of  inconsistent multiplicity cannot be secured, 
thereby putting into question the idea that consistent multiples can be axiomatically woven from the void. however, as 
Badiou argues, cohen’s proof  of  this “un-measure” of  being in fact produces within set-theory ontology a “one” account 
of  inconsistent being qua being. How? In short, it constructs an infinite generic multiple by collecting, starting from the 
void, series of  multiples attached to a supplementary, evental signifier F. Because it is not itself  “discerned,” this generic 
multiple sets no limits to what it can rigorously collect as one and is thus, in the final analysis, “composed of  terms which 
have nothing in common that could be remarked, save belonging to this situation; which, strictly speaking, is its being, qua 
being… it is rightfully declared generic, because, if  one wishes to qualify it, all one can say is that its elements are…[this is] 
the truth of  the entire situation, insofar as the sense of  the indiscernible is that of  exhibiting as one-multiple the very being 
of  what belongs insofar as it belongs” (BE 339/373-374). I expand upon various aspects of  this highly condensed argument 
throughout the article.
7 Alain Badiou, Manifesto for Philosophy. trans. norman madarasz. Albany: state university of  new york Press, 1999. 
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originally published in french as Manifeste pour la philosophie. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1989. the two further essays included 
in the English edition, “The (Re)turn of  Philosophy Itself ” and “Definition of  Philosophy” were originally published as “Le 
(re)tour de la philosophie elle-même” and “Définition de la philosophie” in Conditions. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1992, 57-82. 
All future references to these texts will be given in the body of  the essay as mP (or c), followed by the english and then the 
french pagination.
8 Philosophy’s conditions should not be confused with the “conditions” which provide the material for a generic set and which 
Badiou talks about in meditation 33 of  Being and event.
9 Indeed, because its central category is Truth, philosophy has a specific adversary: the Sophist. This is because the Sophist 
declares that there is no truth, that all is relative, that there are only different language games, etc. the philosopher, however, 
can never finally be finished with the Sophist; for this would require that philosophy declare its access to The Truth, thus 
denying the existence of  those truths which, precisely, condition it (MP 143-144/C 81).
10 On compossibility and God’s bringing into existence the “best” or maximally compossible series of  possibles, see G.W. 
leibniz, new essays on Human Understanding. trans. Peter remnant and Jonathan Bennett. cambridge: cambridge university 
Press, 1996, iii, vi, §12; Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of  God, the Freedom of  Man and the Origin of  Evil. trans. e.m. huggard. 
London: Routledge, 1952, §201; and “Leibniz to Bourguet, December 1714” Philosophical Papers and Letters of  g.W. Leibniz. 
trans. l.e. loemker. dordrecht: reidel, 1969, 661-662. see also christiane frémont’s commentary on this letter in Principes 
de la Nature et de la Grâce, Monadologie et autres textes 1703-1716. Paris: GF Flammarion, 1996, 269-272.
11 this is precisely what is at stake in leibniz’s theodicy. see generally on this, christiane frémont, Singularités, individus et 
relations dans le système de Leibniz. Paris: Vrin, 2003.
12 One might be tempted to say that Badiou’s philosophy is sutured to its scientific or mathematical condition, inasmuch 
as Badiou equates ontology with mathematics. But for Badiou, ontology belongs fully to set theory. it is rather the 
pronouncement that “ontology = mathematics” that is philosophical, that is, within the space of  thought that must account 
for the compossibility of  all of  philosophy’s evental-conditions (See BE 13/20).
13 in line with these geometrical metaphors, in Manifesto for Philosophy, Badiou talks of  disposing of  the “trajectories” of  truth 
procedures as compossible (MP 38/19). He also speaks of  “Truth” as a kind of  “limit,” and describes the relation between 
truths and truth in terms of  a “pincers” of  truth which is formed by a relation between two “branches” (incorrectly translated 
as “limb” by Madaraz) (MP 68, 130/C 68, 71).
14 Badiou describes this two-way condition/conditioned relation between truth and truths when he writes that “philosophy 
seizes truths. this seizing is its act. By this act, philosophy declares that there are truths, and works in such a way as to have 
thought seized by this ‘there are.’ This seizure by the act testifies to the unity of  thought” (MP 141-142/C 79).
15 for a very interesting analysis of  the difference between problematics and axiomatics in the work of  deleuze and Badiou, 
see also daniel W. smith, “mathematics and the theory of  multiplicities: deleuze and Badiou revisited” Southern Journal of  
Philosophy 41: 3 (2003), 411-49.
16 see the collection of  Albert lautman’s works, Les mathématiques, les idées et le réel physique. Paris: Vrin, 2006, 223. All future 
references to this text will be given in the body of  the essay as mirP, followed by the page number. on the question of  the 
“meaning” that the dialectic of  Ideas imparts to the theories, see in particular Jean Petitot, “Refaire le ‘Timée’ – Introduction 
à la philosophie mathématique d’Albert lautman” Revue d’histoire des sciences 40: 1 (1987), 79-115. For an introduction to 
the work of  lautman in english, see charles Alunni, “continental genealogies. mathematical confrontations in Albert 
lautman and gaston Bachelard” virtual Mathematics – the Logic of  difference. ed. simon duffy. manchester: clinamen Press, 
2006, 65-80; and Simon Duffy, “Deleuze and Lautman” Deleuze’s Philosophical Lineage. eds g. Jones and J. roffe. edinburgh: 
edinburgh university Press, forthcoming.
17 Nor can we find this sufficient reason in the theories’ greater or lesser abilities to appropriate an already given empirical 
real. see catherine chevalley, “Albert lautman et le souci logique” Revue d’histoire des sciences 40:1 (1987), 61.
18 The terms mixtes is Lautman’s. See MIRP 197-210.
19 it should here be noted that inclusion is not really another primitive relation, to be added to that of  belonging. rather, 
inclusion can be defined on the basis of  belonging, for β ⊂ α is equivalent to saying (∀γ)[(γ ∈ β) → (γ ∈ α)], or again, for all 
γ, if  γ belongs to β then γ belongs to α (BE 82/96).
20 see also Alain Badiou, Le nombre et les nombres. Paris: Seuil, 1990, 84.
21 taken from Peter hallward, Badiou, A Subject to Truth. Minneapolis and London: University of  Minnesota Press, 2003, 
103.
22 And not only infinite successor ordinals, but also infinite limit ordinals. Consider the series: ω0, ω1, ω2,… ωn, ωn+1,… ωω0, 
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ωs(ω0),… ωω0ω0,… (BE 275-277/304-306).
23 On the admitted importance of  “the famous ‘problem of  the continuum’” for Badiou, see BE 5/11, 281/311.
24 Badiou, deleuze, 91-92.
25 gilles deleuze, difference and Repetition. trans. Paul Patton. london: Athlone, 1994, 163-164. one can further note in 
relation to the conception of  the problem that, for Deleuze, the irreducibly “negativity” of  conflict is only “an illusion, no 
more than a shadow of  problems” in which beings ultimately find their reason. See Deleuze, difference and Repetition, 202.
